Knowledge Base

ECDHE (Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral)

Ephemeral Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman^[432][433] is a variant of Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman^[114][115] key exchange that has forward secrecy^{[127][128][129][130]}, and does protect past sessions against future compromises. If long-term secret keys or passwords are compromised, encrypted communications and sessions recorded in the past cannot be retrieved and decrypted.

Always prefer cipher suites with PFS property over the non-PFS ones. Note that performance considerations implies preferring Ephemeral Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman^[432][433] over Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman^{[405][406][407][408]}.

RSA

Rivest–Shamir–Adleman^{[275][276][277]} is a digital signature^{[107][108][109][110]} algorithm, which is considered secure, however there are known weaknesses^{[278][279][280][281][282]}.

ARIA-128

Encryption algorithm ARIA^{[313][314][315][316]} is a block cipher^{[78][79][80][81]} which is considered secure^[317], but leading client applications do not use this algorithm. Unless your application or requirements specifically call for their use, it is generally safer to avoid cipher suites that are not adopted and supported by a critical mass of the industry.

Remove the cipher suite from the list of cipher suites supported by your server.

GCM

block cipher mode of operation^{[82][83][84][85][86]} Galois/Counter Mode^{[46][47][48][49]} is considered secure. It provides authenticated encryption^[74] which simultaneously assure the confidentiality^[91][92][93] and authenticity^[75][76][77] of data.

If your application or requirements specifically call for the use of a message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} that does not provide authenticated encryption^[74] prefer block cipher mode of operation^{[82][83][84][85][86]} (eg: counter with CBC-MAC^[32][33][34], Galois/Counter Mode^{[46][47][48][49]} or message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} (eg: Poly1305^[458][459]) that proved authenticated encryption over the ones which does not provide it.

128

The symmetric key^{[185][186][187]} withkey size^[184] more than 128 bits as it is should be according to National Institute of Standards and Technology^[470][471] so it is not vulnerable to preimage attack^[67] and it cannreliably prove that message came from the stated sender (its authenticity) and has not been changed, so connection is not open for a man-in-the-middle attack^[61].

Remove the cipher suite from the list of cipher suites supported by your server.

128

The block cipher^{[78][79][80][81]} uses a block size^[87] larger than 64 bits, so it is not vulnerable to sweet32 attack^{[22][23][24][25]}.

SHA2-256

message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} is a hashed message authentication code^{[139][140][141][142][143][144][145]} which is considered secure. The underlaying cryptographic hash function^{[94][95][96][97]} (Secure Hash Algorithm 2^{[212][213][214]}) is also considered secure.

If your application or requirements specifically call for the use of a message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} that does not provide authenticated encryption^[74] prefer block cipher mode of operation^{[82][83][84][85][86]} (eg: counter with CBC-MAC^[32][33][34], Galois/Counter Mode^{[46][47][48][49]} or message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} (eg: Poly1305^[458][459]) that proved authenticated encryption over the ones which does not provide it. In case of a hashed message authentication code^{[139][140][141][142][143][144][145]} prefer message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} based on Secure Hash Algorithm 2^{[212][213][214]} over the ones based on Secure Hash Algorithm 1^{[202][203][204]}.