Knowledge Base

ECDHE (Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral)

Ephemeral Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman^[432][433] is a variant of Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman^[114][115] key exchange that has forward secrecy^{[127][128][129][130]}, and does protect past sessions against future compromises. If long-term secret keys or passwords are compromised, encrypted communications and sessions recorded in the past cannot be retrieved and decrypted.

Always prefer cipher suites with PFS property over the non-PFS ones. Note that performance considerations implies preferring Ephemeral Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman^[432][433] over Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman^{[405][406][407][408]}.

ECDSA

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm^{[266][267][268][269]} is the elliptic-curve cryptography^{[118][119][120][121]} based variant of the digital signature^{[107][108][109][110]} names Digital Signature Algorithm^{[258][259][260][261][262][263]} algorithm. It is considered secure ^[270][271] and gives better performance and smaller key sizes.

3DES EDE

Encryption algorithm Triple DES^{[295][296][297]} is a block cipher^{[78][79][80][81]} which is still recognized as secure, but deprecated. It has multiple vulnerabilities^{[298][299][300][301]} (eg: sweet32 attack^{[22][23][24][25]}, meet-in-the-middle attack^[62], brute-force attack^[54]) and it is considered as weak and disallowed by National Institute of Standards and Technology^[470][471] after 2023.

Remove the cipher suite from the list of cipher suites supported by your server.

CBC

Encryption mode is cipher block chaining^[28][29][30]. It is vulnerable^[31] to timing attack^[188] (eg: Lucky Thirteen attack^[11][12]) and padding oracle attack^{[63][64][65][66]} (eg: POODLE attack^[13][14][15]).

Remove the cipher suite from the list of cipher suites supported by your server or at least set the cipher suite order explicitly and any cipher suite modes be preferred over ciphers suites with CBC modes.

128

The symmetric key^{[185][186][187]} withkey size^[184] more than 128 bits as it is should be according to National Institute of Standards and Technology^[470][471] so it is not vulnerable to preimage attack^[67] and it cannreliably prove that message came from the stated sender (its authenticity) and has not been changed, so connection is not open for a man-in-the-middle attack^[61].

Remove the cipher suite from the list of cipher suites supported by your server.

64

Any block cipher^{[78][79][80][81]} uses a block size^[87] of 64 bits is vulnerable to sweet32 attack^{[22][23][24][25]}.

Remove the cipher suite from the list of cipher suites supported by your server, or setup yout server to enforce changing session key regularly (rekeying^[174]).

SHA-1

message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} is a hashed message authentication code^{[139][140][141][142][143][144][145]} which is considered secure^[462], despite the fact that the underlayingcryptographic hash function^{[94][95][96][97]} (Secure Hash Algorithm 1^{[202][203][204]}) is considered insecure^{[205][206][207][208][209][210][211]}.

If your application or requirements specifically call for the use of a message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} that does not provide authenticated encryption^[74] prefer block cipher mode of operation^{[82][83][84][85][86]} (eg: counter with CBC-MAC^[32][33][34], Galois/Counter Mode^{[46][47][48][49]} or message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} (eg: Poly1305^[458][459]) that proved authenticated encryption over the ones which does not provide it. In case of a hashed message authentication code^{[139][140][141][142][143][144][145]} prefer message authentication code^{[135][136][137][138]} based on Secure Hash Algorithm 2^{[212][213][214]} over the ones based on Secure Hash Algorithm 1^{[202][203][204]}.