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2048
The Diffie-Hellman ephemeral public key parameter[409][410][411] with prime size greater than 2048[422] is considered secure, not weakened against logjam attack[7][8][9][10].
Use a well-known Diffie-Hellman ephemeral public key parameter[426][427][428], or generate a custom Diffie-Hellman ephemeral public key parameter[409][410][411] with a size greater or equal than 2048 bits but less or equal than 4096 bits. In the case of custom parameters, validate that the prime is a safe prime[176] to avoid a small subgroup confinement attack[72][73].
False
The Diffie-Hellman[99][100][101][102][103] key exchange provides no protection against a cryptanalytic attack by a quantum computer, and no classical Diffie-Hellman does — just as no classical elliptic curve does — because a quantum computer breaks the hardness assumption they rely on. Only a hybrid key exchange (a classical algorithm combined with a post-quantum cryptography[158][159] one) or a pure post-quantum algorithm is quantum-safe.
Enable a hybrid key exchange or a pure post-quantum algorithm on your server, and prefer it where the configuration allows, so the connection stays secure against a future quantum computer.
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBCAKCAQEA6reKef5mzbMM6SjeNRpZ1or1A3DYkess2nSPteTU4uFuDIL3mPpJ HffFlrYurSb6YbK4fNWUZJd//CMEpOZQUE3C1KLEdHrBnW8SvgvuA/ts4j+LaDL2 0GegAOY90d3FgYtP8NKBaBVF+5yRmB/h4QquXctNdR6+megs1HnFoTEoVvZR7EkN 36C5j2me0vQ3E77mvAHtFnnB4nrYf6otj2DO81rt2QeeKEtfO1rd/fmqlN0aR1c0 OUArFXmjFKwic9UJfp6mpPE+ySso6EGNqss+Fippo+CoZCSVBPG95EPf3J9xR4/g pjsF+NHDTls/hzQkq7/10NLB6mU4WwMVVwIBAg== -----END DH PARAMETERS-----
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBDAKCAQEA6reKef5mzbMM6SjeNRpZ1or1A3DYkess2nSPteTU4uFuDIL3mPpJ HffFlrYurSb6YbK4fNWUZJd//CMEpOZQUE3C1KLEdHrBnW8SvgvuA/ts4j+LaDL2 0GegAOY90d3FgYtP8NKBaBVF+5yRmB/h4QquXctNdR6+megs1HnFoTEoVvZR7EkN 36C5j2me0vQ3E77mvAHtFnnB4nrYf6otj2DO81rt2QeeKEtfO1rd/fmqlN0aR1c0 OUArFXmjFKwic9UJfp6mpPE+ySso6EGNqss+Fippo+CoZCSVBPG95EPf3J9xR4/g pjsF+NHDTls/hzQkq7/10NLB6mU4WwMVVwIBAgICAOE= -----END DH PARAMETERS-----
powermod(x, k, m) = lift(Mod(x, m) ^ k); g = 0x2; p = 0xeab78a79fe66cdb30ce928de351a59d68af50370d891eb2cda748fb5e4d4e2e16e0c82f798fa491df7c596b62ead26fa61b2b87cd59464977ffc2304a4e650504dc2d4a2c4747ac19d6f12be0bee03fb6ce23f8b6832f6d067a000e63dd1ddc5818b4ff0d281681545fb9c91981fe1e10aae5dcb4d751ebe99e82cd479c5a1312856f651ec490ddfa0b98f699ed2f43713bee6bc01ed1679c1e27ad87faa2d8f60cef35aedd9079e284b5f3b5addfdf9aa94dd1a47573439402b1579a314ac2273d5097e9ea6a4f13ec92b28e8418daacb3e162a69a3e0a864249504f1bde443dfdc9f71478fe0a63b05f8d1c34e5b3f873424abbff5d0d2c1ea65385b031557; s = 256; a = 2 ^ (s - 1) + random(2 ^ (s - 1)); A = powermod(g, a, p); b = 2 ^ (s - 1) + random(2 ^ (s - 1)); B = powermod(g, b, p); S = powermod(B, a, p);
$\begin{eqnarray}
p \equiv 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 \\
g \equiv 0x2 \\
\\
a \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\
b \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\
\\
A \equiv g^a \pmod{p} \\
B \equiv g^b \pmod{p} \\
\\
S \equiv {(g^{a})}^{b}={(g^{b})}^{a}=g^{ab} \pmod{p}
\end{eqnarray}$