Get a prompt and clear overview of your security configuration. Right now!
2048
The Diffie-Hellman ephemeral public key parameter[409][410][411] with prime size greater than 2048[422] is considered secure, not weakened against logjam attack[7][8][9][10].
Use a well-known Diffie-Hellman ephemeral public key parameter[426][427][428], or generate a custom Diffie-Hellman ephemeral public key parameter[409][410][411] with a size greater or equal than 2048 bits but less or equal than 4096 bits. In the case of custom parameters, validate that the prime is a safe prime[176] to avoid a small subgroup confinement attack[72][73].
False
The Diffie-Hellman[99][100][101][102][103] key exchange provides no protection against a cryptanalytic attack by a quantum computer, and no classical Diffie-Hellman does — just as no classical elliptic curve does — because a quantum computer breaks the hardness assumption they rely on. Only a hybrid key exchange (a classical algorithm combined with a post-quantum cryptography[158][159] one) or a pure post-quantum algorithm is quantum-safe.
Enable a hybrid key exchange or a pure post-quantum algorithm on your server, and prefer it where the configuration allows, so the connection stays secure against a future quantum computer.
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBEwKCAQwwggEIAoIBAQC/KBtoaZAvN59aUCNzLBHyrHw+WLkjPgIHTbrZLMGe +cQvvI2GSyqHhpMyD3JA/n6iwTLwZZzDGSUt62pJlHktob4FJqyNadwufrX9PCt9 QyJT9h4ERddThP1rEnJHBK+krEtVtnlCQIhUSNVNOrK/bCaVKd2Lnu24YI61NbYi RB/7VnT+8CzmDCLJNbMblrsKWsMJoMylQJAPWaKJaSppeeTTJMaM2ryYOlsWrmNs C0NP8y7IqWtYaqmOZAk9iERPlywdmLCpwLaNGTcft8mGqNw3TWQn8/Ure2t2hD/B I5ctcfe2wjUoEJbWaQwuH5/fgoFXVzml8oEpV/kv0AOrAgECAgEC -----END DH PARAMETERS-----
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBFwKCAQwwggEIAoIBAQC/KBtoaZAvN59aUCNzLBHyrHw+WLkjPgIHTbrZLMGe +cQvvI2GSyqHhpMyD3JA/n6iwTLwZZzDGSUt62pJlHktob4FJqyNadwufrX9PCt9 QyJT9h4ERddThP1rEnJHBK+krEtVtnlCQIhUSNVNOrK/bCaVKd2Lnu24YI61NbYi RB/7VnT+8CzmDCLJNbMblrsKWsMJoMylQJAPWaKJaSppeeTTJMaM2ryYOlsWrmNs C0NP8y7IqWtYaqmOZAk9iERPlywdmLCpwLaNGTcft8mGqNw3TWQn8/Ure2t2hD/B I5ctcfe2wjUoEJbWaQwuH5/fgoFXVzml8oEpV/kv0AOrAgECAgECAgIA4Q== -----END DH PARAMETERS-----
powermod(x, k, m) = lift(Mod(x, m) ^ k); g = 0x2; p = 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; s = 256; a = 2 ^ (s - 1) + random(2 ^ (s - 1)); A = powermod(g, a, p); b = 2 ^ (s - 1) + random(2 ^ (s - 1)); B = powermod(g, b, p); S = powermod(B, a, p);
$\begin{eqnarray}
p \equiv 0x308201080282010100bf281b6869902f379f5a5023732c11f2ac7c3e58b9233e02074dbad92cc19ef9c42fbc8d864b2a878693320f7240fe7ea2c132f0659cc319252deb6a4994792da1be0526ac8d69dc2e7eb5fd3c2b7d432253f61e0445d75384fd6b12724704afa4ac4b55b6794240885448d54d3ab2bf6c269529dd8b9eedb8608eb535b622441ffb5674fef02ce60c22c935b31b96bb0a5ac309a0cca540900f59a289692a6979e4d324c68cdabc983a5b16ae636c0b434ff32ec8a96b586aa98e64093d88444f972c1d98b0a9c0b68d19371fb7c986a8dc374d6427f3f52b7b6b76843fc123972d71f7b6c235281096d6690c2e1f9fdf8281575739a5f2812957f92fd003ab020102 \\
g \equiv 0x2 \\
\\
a \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\
b \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\
\\
A \equiv g^a \pmod{p} \\
B \equiv g^b \pmod{p} \\
\\
S \equiv {(g^{a})}^{b}={(g^{b})}^{a}=g^{ab} \pmod{p}
\end{eqnarray}$